comparison urllib3/util/ssl_match_hostname.py @ 7:5eb2d5e3bf22

planemo upload for repository https://toolrepo.galaxytrakr.org/view/jpayne/bioproject_to_srr_2/556cac4fb538
author jpayne
date Sun, 05 May 2024 23:32:17 -0400
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6:b2745907b1eb 7:5eb2d5e3bf22
1 """The match_hostname() function from Python 3.5, essential when using SSL."""
2
3 # Note: This file is under the PSF license as the code comes from the python
4 # stdlib. http://docs.python.org/3/license.html
5 # It is modified to remove commonName support.
6
7 from __future__ import annotations
8
9 import ipaddress
10 import re
11 import typing
12 from ipaddress import IPv4Address, IPv6Address
13
14 if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
15 from .ssl_ import _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT
16
17 __version__ = "3.5.0.1"
18
19
20 class CertificateError(ValueError):
21 pass
22
23
24 def _dnsname_match(
25 dn: typing.Any, hostname: str, max_wildcards: int = 1
26 ) -> typing.Match[str] | None | bool:
27 """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
28
29 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
30 """
31 pats = []
32 if not dn:
33 return False
34
35 # Ported from python3-syntax:
36 # leftmost, *remainder = dn.split(r'.')
37 parts = dn.split(r".")
38 leftmost = parts[0]
39 remainder = parts[1:]
40
41 wildcards = leftmost.count("*")
42 if wildcards > max_wildcards:
43 # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
44 # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
45 # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
46 # reasonable choice.
47 raise CertificateError(
48 "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn)
49 )
50
51 # speed up common case w/o wildcards
52 if not wildcards:
53 return bool(dn.lower() == hostname.lower())
54
55 # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
56 # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
57 # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
58 if leftmost == "*":
59 # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
60 # fragment.
61 pats.append("[^.]+")
62 elif leftmost.startswith("xn--") or hostname.startswith("xn--"):
63 # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
64 # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
65 # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
66 # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
67 pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
68 else:
69 # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
70 pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r"\*", "[^.]*"))
71
72 # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
73 for frag in remainder:
74 pats.append(re.escape(frag))
75
76 pat = re.compile(r"\A" + r"\.".join(pats) + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE)
77 return pat.match(hostname)
78
79
80 def _ipaddress_match(ipname: str, host_ip: IPv4Address | IPv6Address) -> bool:
81 """Exact matching of IP addresses.
82
83 RFC 9110 section 4.3.5: "A reference identity of IP-ID contains the decoded
84 bytes of the IP address. An IP version 4 address is 4 octets, and an IP
85 version 6 address is 16 octets. [...] A reference identity of type IP-ID
86 matches if the address is identical to an iPAddress value of the
87 subjectAltName extension of the certificate."
88 """
89 # OpenSSL may add a trailing newline to a subjectAltName's IP address
90 # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
91 ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ipname.rstrip())
92 return bool(ip.packed == host_ip.packed)
93
94
95 def match_hostname(
96 cert: _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT | None,
97 hostname: str,
98 hostname_checks_common_name: bool = False,
99 ) -> None:
100 """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
101 SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
102 rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
103
104 CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
105 returns nothing.
106 """
107 if not cert:
108 raise ValueError(
109 "empty or no certificate, match_hostname needs a "
110 "SSL socket or SSL context with either "
111 "CERT_OPTIONAL or CERT_REQUIRED"
112 )
113 try:
114 # Divergence from upstream: ipaddress can't handle byte str
115 #
116 # The ipaddress module shipped with Python < 3.9 does not support
117 # scoped IPv6 addresses so we unconditionally strip the Zone IDs for
118 # now. Once we drop support for Python 3.9 we can remove this branch.
119 if "%" in hostname:
120 host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname[: hostname.rfind("%")])
121 else:
122 host_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
123
124 except ValueError:
125 # Not an IP address (common case)
126 host_ip = None
127 dnsnames = []
128 san: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = cert.get("subjectAltName", ())
129 key: str
130 value: str
131 for key, value in san:
132 if key == "DNS":
133 if host_ip is None and _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
134 return
135 dnsnames.append(value)
136 elif key == "IP Address":
137 if host_ip is not None and _ipaddress_match(value, host_ip):
138 return
139 dnsnames.append(value)
140
141 # We only check 'commonName' if it's enabled and we're not verifying
142 # an IP address. IP addresses aren't valid within 'commonName'.
143 if hostname_checks_common_name and host_ip is None and not dnsnames:
144 for sub in cert.get("subject", ()):
145 for key, value in sub:
146 if key == "commonName":
147 if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
148 return
149 dnsnames.append(value)
150
151 if len(dnsnames) > 1:
152 raise CertificateError(
153 "hostname %r "
154 "doesn't match either of %s" % (hostname, ", ".join(map(repr, dnsnames)))
155 )
156 elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
157 raise CertificateError(f"hostname {hostname!r} doesn't match {dnsnames[0]!r}")
158 else:
159 raise CertificateError("no appropriate subjectAltName fields were found")