Mercurial > repos > jpayne > bioproject_to_srr_2
diff urllib3/util/ssl_.py @ 7:5eb2d5e3bf22
planemo upload for repository https://toolrepo.galaxytrakr.org/view/jpayne/bioproject_to_srr_2/556cac4fb538
author | jpayne |
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date | Sun, 05 May 2024 23:32:17 -0400 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/urllib3/util/ssl_.py Sun May 05 23:32:17 2024 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +from __future__ import annotations + +import hmac +import os +import socket +import sys +import typing +import warnings +from binascii import unhexlify +from hashlib import md5, sha1, sha256 + +from ..exceptions import ProxySchemeUnsupported, SSLError +from .url import _BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE, _IPV4_RE + +SSLContext = None +SSLTransport = None +HAS_NEVER_CHECK_COMMON_NAME = False +IS_PYOPENSSL = False +ALPN_PROTOCOLS = ["http/1.1"] + +_TYPE_VERSION_INFO = typing.Tuple[int, int, int, str, int] + +# Maps the length of a digest to a possible hash function producing this digest +HASHFUNC_MAP = {32: md5, 40: sha1, 64: sha256} + + +def _is_bpo_43522_fixed( + implementation_name: str, + version_info: _TYPE_VERSION_INFO, + pypy_version_info: _TYPE_VERSION_INFO | None, +) -> bool: + """Return True for CPython 3.8.9+, 3.9.3+ or 3.10+ and PyPy 7.3.8+ where + setting SSLContext.hostname_checks_common_name to False works. + + Outside of CPython and PyPy we don't know which implementations work + or not so we conservatively use our hostname matching as we know that works + on all implementations. + + https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/issues/2192#issuecomment-821832963 + https://foss.heptapod.net/pypy/pypy/-/issues/3539 + """ + if implementation_name == "pypy": + # https://foss.heptapod.net/pypy/pypy/-/issues/3129 + return pypy_version_info >= (7, 3, 8) # type: ignore[operator] + elif implementation_name == "cpython": + major_minor = version_info[:2] + micro = version_info[2] + return ( + (major_minor == (3, 8) and micro >= 9) + or (major_minor == (3, 9) and micro >= 3) + or major_minor >= (3, 10) + ) + else: # Defensive: + return False + + +def _is_has_never_check_common_name_reliable( + openssl_version: str, + openssl_version_number: int, + implementation_name: str, + version_info: _TYPE_VERSION_INFO, + pypy_version_info: _TYPE_VERSION_INFO | None, +) -> bool: + # As of May 2023, all released versions of LibreSSL fail to reject certificates with + # only common names, see https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/pull/3024 + is_openssl = openssl_version.startswith("OpenSSL ") + # Before fixing OpenSSL issue #14579, the SSL_new() API was not copying hostflags + # like X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, which tripped up CPython. + # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/14579 + # This was released in OpenSSL 1.1.1l+ (>=0x101010cf) + is_openssl_issue_14579_fixed = openssl_version_number >= 0x101010CF + + return is_openssl and ( + is_openssl_issue_14579_fixed + or _is_bpo_43522_fixed(implementation_name, version_info, pypy_version_info) + ) + + +if typing.TYPE_CHECKING: + from ssl import VerifyMode + from typing import Literal, TypedDict + + from .ssltransport import SSLTransport as SSLTransportType + + class _TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT(TypedDict, total=False): + subjectAltName: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] + subject: tuple[tuple[tuple[str, str], ...], ...] + serialNumber: str + + +# Mapping from 'ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSX' to 'TLSVersion.X' +_SSL_VERSION_TO_TLS_VERSION: dict[int, int] = {} + +try: # Do we have ssl at all? + import ssl + from ssl import ( # type: ignore[assignment] + CERT_REQUIRED, + HAS_NEVER_CHECK_COMMON_NAME, + OP_NO_COMPRESSION, + OP_NO_TICKET, + OPENSSL_VERSION, + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, + PROTOCOL_TLS, + PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT, + OP_NO_SSLv2, + OP_NO_SSLv3, + SSLContext, + TLSVersion, + ) + + PROTOCOL_SSLv23 = PROTOCOL_TLS + + # Setting SSLContext.hostname_checks_common_name = False didn't work before CPython + # 3.8.9, 3.9.3, and 3.10 (but OK on PyPy) or OpenSSL 1.1.1l+ + if HAS_NEVER_CHECK_COMMON_NAME and not _is_has_never_check_common_name_reliable( + OPENSSL_VERSION, + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, + sys.implementation.name, + sys.version_info, + sys.pypy_version_info if sys.implementation.name == "pypy" else None, # type: ignore[attr-defined] + ): + HAS_NEVER_CHECK_COMMON_NAME = False + + # Need to be careful here in case old TLS versions get + # removed in future 'ssl' module implementations. + for attr in ("TLSv1", "TLSv1_1", "TLSv1_2"): + try: + _SSL_VERSION_TO_TLS_VERSION[getattr(ssl, f"PROTOCOL_{attr}")] = getattr( + TLSVersion, attr + ) + except AttributeError: # Defensive: + continue + + from .ssltransport import SSLTransport # type: ignore[assignment] +except ImportError: + OP_NO_COMPRESSION = 0x20000 # type: ignore[assignment] + OP_NO_TICKET = 0x4000 # type: ignore[assignment] + OP_NO_SSLv2 = 0x1000000 # type: ignore[assignment] + OP_NO_SSLv3 = 0x2000000 # type: ignore[assignment] + PROTOCOL_SSLv23 = PROTOCOL_TLS = 2 # type: ignore[assignment] + PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT = 16 # type: ignore[assignment] + + +_TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET = typing.Union["_TYPE_PEER_CERT_RET_DICT", bytes, None] + + +def assert_fingerprint(cert: bytes | None, fingerprint: str) -> None: + """ + Checks if given fingerprint matches the supplied certificate. + + :param cert: + Certificate as bytes object. + :param fingerprint: + Fingerprint as string of hexdigits, can be interspersed by colons. + """ + + if cert is None: + raise SSLError("No certificate for the peer.") + + fingerprint = fingerprint.replace(":", "").lower() + digest_length = len(fingerprint) + hashfunc = HASHFUNC_MAP.get(digest_length) + if not hashfunc: + raise SSLError(f"Fingerprint of invalid length: {fingerprint}") + + # We need encode() here for py32; works on py2 and p33. + fingerprint_bytes = unhexlify(fingerprint.encode()) + + cert_digest = hashfunc(cert).digest() + + if not hmac.compare_digest(cert_digest, fingerprint_bytes): + raise SSLError( + f'Fingerprints did not match. Expected "{fingerprint}", got "{cert_digest.hex()}"' + ) + + +def resolve_cert_reqs(candidate: None | int | str) -> VerifyMode: + """ + Resolves the argument to a numeric constant, which can be passed to + the wrap_socket function/method from the ssl module. + Defaults to :data:`ssl.CERT_REQUIRED`. + If given a string it is assumed to be the name of the constant in the + :mod:`ssl` module or its abbreviation. + (So you can specify `REQUIRED` instead of `CERT_REQUIRED`. + If it's neither `None` nor a string we assume it is already the numeric + constant which can directly be passed to wrap_socket. + """ + if candidate is None: + return CERT_REQUIRED + + if isinstance(candidate, str): + res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None) + if res is None: + res = getattr(ssl, "CERT_" + candidate) + return res # type: ignore[no-any-return] + + return candidate # type: ignore[return-value] + + +def resolve_ssl_version(candidate: None | int | str) -> int: + """ + like resolve_cert_reqs + """ + if candidate is None: + return PROTOCOL_TLS + + if isinstance(candidate, str): + res = getattr(ssl, candidate, None) + if res is None: + res = getattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_" + candidate) + return typing.cast(int, res) + + return candidate + + +def create_urllib3_context( + ssl_version: int | None = None, + cert_reqs: int | None = None, + options: int | None = None, + ciphers: str | None = None, + ssl_minimum_version: int | None = None, + ssl_maximum_version: int | None = None, +) -> ssl.SSLContext: + """Creates and configures an :class:`ssl.SSLContext` instance for use with urllib3. + + :param ssl_version: + The desired protocol version to use. This will default to + PROTOCOL_SSLv23 which will negotiate the highest protocol that both + the server and your installation of OpenSSL support. + + This parameter is deprecated instead use 'ssl_minimum_version'. + :param ssl_minimum_version: + The minimum version of TLS to be used. Use the 'ssl.TLSVersion' enum for specifying the value. + :param ssl_maximum_version: + The maximum version of TLS to be used. Use the 'ssl.TLSVersion' enum for specifying the value. + Not recommended to set to anything other than 'ssl.TLSVersion.MAXIMUM_SUPPORTED' which is the + default value. + :param cert_reqs: + Whether to require the certificate verification. This defaults to + ``ssl.CERT_REQUIRED``. + :param options: + Specific OpenSSL options. These default to ``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv2``, + ``ssl.OP_NO_SSLv3``, ``ssl.OP_NO_COMPRESSION``, and ``ssl.OP_NO_TICKET``. + :param ciphers: + Which cipher suites to allow the server to select. Defaults to either system configured + ciphers if OpenSSL 1.1.1+, otherwise uses a secure default set of ciphers. + :returns: + Constructed SSLContext object with specified options + :rtype: SSLContext + """ + if SSLContext is None: + raise TypeError("Can't create an SSLContext object without an ssl module") + + # This means 'ssl_version' was specified as an exact value. + if ssl_version not in (None, PROTOCOL_TLS, PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT): + # Disallow setting 'ssl_version' and 'ssl_minimum|maximum_version' + # to avoid conflicts. + if ssl_minimum_version is not None or ssl_maximum_version is not None: + raise ValueError( + "Can't specify both 'ssl_version' and either " + "'ssl_minimum_version' or 'ssl_maximum_version'" + ) + + # 'ssl_version' is deprecated and will be removed in the future. + else: + # Use 'ssl_minimum_version' and 'ssl_maximum_version' instead. + ssl_minimum_version = _SSL_VERSION_TO_TLS_VERSION.get( + ssl_version, TLSVersion.MINIMUM_SUPPORTED + ) + ssl_maximum_version = _SSL_VERSION_TO_TLS_VERSION.get( + ssl_version, TLSVersion.MAXIMUM_SUPPORTED + ) + + # This warning message is pushing users to use 'ssl_minimum_version' + # instead of both min/max. Best practice is to only set the minimum version and + # keep the maximum version to be it's default value: 'TLSVersion.MAXIMUM_SUPPORTED' + warnings.warn( + "'ssl_version' option is deprecated and will be " + "removed in urllib3 v2.1.0. Instead use 'ssl_minimum_version'", + category=DeprecationWarning, + stacklevel=2, + ) + + # PROTOCOL_TLS is deprecated in Python 3.10 so we always use PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT + context = SSLContext(PROTOCOL_TLS_CLIENT) + + if ssl_minimum_version is not None: + context.minimum_version = ssl_minimum_version + else: # Python <3.10 defaults to 'MINIMUM_SUPPORTED' so explicitly set TLSv1.2 here + context.minimum_version = TLSVersion.TLSv1_2 + + if ssl_maximum_version is not None: + context.maximum_version = ssl_maximum_version + + # Unless we're given ciphers defer to either system ciphers in + # the case of OpenSSL 1.1.1+ or use our own secure default ciphers. + if ciphers: + context.set_ciphers(ciphers) + + # Setting the default here, as we may have no ssl module on import + cert_reqs = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if cert_reqs is None else cert_reqs + + if options is None: + options = 0 + # SSLv2 is easily broken and is considered harmful and dangerous + options |= OP_NO_SSLv2 + # SSLv3 has several problems and is now dangerous + options |= OP_NO_SSLv3 + # Disable compression to prevent CRIME attacks for OpenSSL 1.0+ + # (issue #309) + options |= OP_NO_COMPRESSION + # TLSv1.2 only. Unless set explicitly, do not request tickets. + # This may save some bandwidth on wire, and although the ticket is encrypted, + # there is a risk associated with it being on wire, + # if the server is not rotating its ticketing keys properly. + options |= OP_NO_TICKET + + context.options |= options + + # Enable post-handshake authentication for TLS 1.3, see GH #1634. PHA is + # necessary for conditional client cert authentication with TLS 1.3. + # The attribute is None for OpenSSL <= 1.1.0 or does not exist when using + # an SSLContext created by pyOpenSSL. + if getattr(context, "post_handshake_auth", None) is not None: + context.post_handshake_auth = True + + # The order of the below lines setting verify_mode and check_hostname + # matter due to safe-guards SSLContext has to prevent an SSLContext with + # check_hostname=True, verify_mode=NONE/OPTIONAL. + # We always set 'check_hostname=False' for pyOpenSSL so we rely on our own + # 'ssl.match_hostname()' implementation. + if cert_reqs == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED and not IS_PYOPENSSL: + context.verify_mode = cert_reqs + context.check_hostname = True + else: + context.check_hostname = False + context.verify_mode = cert_reqs + + try: + context.hostname_checks_common_name = False + except AttributeError: # Defensive: for CPython < 3.8.9 and 3.9.3; for PyPy < 7.3.8 + pass + + # Enable logging of TLS session keys via defacto standard environment variable + # 'SSLKEYLOGFILE', if the feature is available (Python 3.8+). Skip empty values. + if hasattr(context, "keylog_filename"): + sslkeylogfile = os.environ.get("SSLKEYLOGFILE") + if sslkeylogfile: + context.keylog_filename = sslkeylogfile + + return context + + +@typing.overload +def ssl_wrap_socket( + sock: socket.socket, + keyfile: str | None = ..., + certfile: str | None = ..., + cert_reqs: int | None = ..., + ca_certs: str | None = ..., + server_hostname: str | None = ..., + ssl_version: int | None = ..., + ciphers: str | None = ..., + ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = ..., + ca_cert_dir: str | None = ..., + key_password: str | None = ..., + ca_cert_data: None | str | bytes = ..., + tls_in_tls: Literal[False] = ..., +) -> ssl.SSLSocket: + ... + + +@typing.overload +def ssl_wrap_socket( + sock: socket.socket, + keyfile: str | None = ..., + certfile: str | None = ..., + cert_reqs: int | None = ..., + ca_certs: str | None = ..., + server_hostname: str | None = ..., + ssl_version: int | None = ..., + ciphers: str | None = ..., + ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = ..., + ca_cert_dir: str | None = ..., + key_password: str | None = ..., + ca_cert_data: None | str | bytes = ..., + tls_in_tls: bool = ..., +) -> ssl.SSLSocket | SSLTransportType: + ... + + +def ssl_wrap_socket( + sock: socket.socket, + keyfile: str | None = None, + certfile: str | None = None, + cert_reqs: int | None = None, + ca_certs: str | None = None, + server_hostname: str | None = None, + ssl_version: int | None = None, + ciphers: str | None = None, + ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None = None, + ca_cert_dir: str | None = None, + key_password: str | None = None, + ca_cert_data: None | str | bytes = None, + tls_in_tls: bool = False, +) -> ssl.SSLSocket | SSLTransportType: + """ + All arguments except for server_hostname, ssl_context, tls_in_tls, ca_cert_data and + ca_cert_dir have the same meaning as they do when using + :func:`ssl.create_default_context`, :meth:`ssl.SSLContext.load_cert_chain`, + :meth:`ssl.SSLContext.set_ciphers` and :meth:`ssl.SSLContext.wrap_socket`. + + :param server_hostname: + When SNI is supported, the expected hostname of the certificate + :param ssl_context: + A pre-made :class:`SSLContext` object. If none is provided, one will + be created using :func:`create_urllib3_context`. + :param ciphers: + A string of ciphers we wish the client to support. + :param ca_cert_dir: + A directory containing CA certificates in multiple separate files, as + supported by OpenSSL's -CApath flag or the capath argument to + SSLContext.load_verify_locations(). + :param key_password: + Optional password if the keyfile is encrypted. + :param ca_cert_data: + Optional string containing CA certificates in PEM format suitable for + passing as the cadata parameter to SSLContext.load_verify_locations() + :param tls_in_tls: + Use SSLTransport to wrap the existing socket. + """ + context = ssl_context + if context is None: + # Note: This branch of code and all the variables in it are only used in tests. + # We should consider deprecating and removing this code. + context = create_urllib3_context(ssl_version, cert_reqs, ciphers=ciphers) + + if ca_certs or ca_cert_dir or ca_cert_data: + try: + context.load_verify_locations(ca_certs, ca_cert_dir, ca_cert_data) + except OSError as e: + raise SSLError(e) from e + + elif ssl_context is None and hasattr(context, "load_default_certs"): + # try to load OS default certs; works well on Windows. + context.load_default_certs() + + # Attempt to detect if we get the goofy behavior of the + # keyfile being encrypted and OpenSSL asking for the + # passphrase via the terminal and instead error out. + if keyfile and key_password is None and _is_key_file_encrypted(keyfile): + raise SSLError("Client private key is encrypted, password is required") + + if certfile: + if key_password is None: + context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile) + else: + context.load_cert_chain(certfile, keyfile, key_password) + + try: + context.set_alpn_protocols(ALPN_PROTOCOLS) + except NotImplementedError: # Defensive: in CI, we always have set_alpn_protocols + pass + + ssl_sock = _ssl_wrap_socket_impl(sock, context, tls_in_tls, server_hostname) + return ssl_sock + + +def is_ipaddress(hostname: str | bytes) -> bool: + """Detects whether the hostname given is an IPv4 or IPv6 address. + Also detects IPv6 addresses with Zone IDs. + + :param str hostname: Hostname to examine. + :return: True if the hostname is an IP address, False otherwise. + """ + if isinstance(hostname, bytes): + # IDN A-label bytes are ASCII compatible. + hostname = hostname.decode("ascii") + return bool(_IPV4_RE.match(hostname) or _BRACELESS_IPV6_ADDRZ_RE.match(hostname)) + + +def _is_key_file_encrypted(key_file: str) -> bool: + """Detects if a key file is encrypted or not.""" + with open(key_file) as f: + for line in f: + # Look for Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED + if "ENCRYPTED" in line: + return True + + return False + + +def _ssl_wrap_socket_impl( + sock: socket.socket, + ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext, + tls_in_tls: bool, + server_hostname: str | None = None, +) -> ssl.SSLSocket | SSLTransportType: + if tls_in_tls: + if not SSLTransport: + # Import error, ssl is not available. + raise ProxySchemeUnsupported( + "TLS in TLS requires support for the 'ssl' module" + ) + + SSLTransport._validate_ssl_context_for_tls_in_tls(ssl_context) + return SSLTransport(sock, ssl_context, server_hostname) + + return ssl_context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=server_hostname)